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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MELINDA GILLEY,

:

APPELLEE'S RESPONSIVE BRIEF

Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

:

G. BARTON BLACKSTOCK, AND
THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
SAFETY, OFFICE OF DRIVERS
LICENSE SERVICE,

:.

Case No. 20010828-CA
(Lower Docket 010300534)

:

Priority No. 14

:

Defendant/Appellee.

Respondent/Appellee G. Barton Blackstock, and the Department of Public Safety,
Office of Drivers License Division ("the Division") responds to Petitioner/Appellant
Melinda Gilley, appeal of the lower court's final order dismissing Gilley's appeal from
the Driver License Division's administrative order revoking her driving privilege.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Gilley appeals from the District Court's final order of dismissal entered October
10, 2001, following a hearing on the Division's motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals
has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann 78-2;i-3(b)( i) (1997).
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RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following statutes and constitutional provision will be determinative of the
issue on appeal:
Rule 5(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(b) Service: How made and by whom.
(1) Whenever under these rules service is required or
permitted to be made upon a party represented by an attorney
the service shall be made upon the attorney unless service
upon the party is ordered by the court. Service upon the
attorney or upon a party shall be made by delivering a copy or
by mailing a copy to the last known address or, if no address
is known, by leaving it with the clerk of the court.
(A) Delivery of a copy within this rule means: Handing it
to the attorney or to the party; or leaving it at the person's
office with a clerk or person in charge thereof; or, if there is
no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous place therein; or,
if the office is closed or the person to be served has no office,
leaving it at the person's dwelling house or usual place of
abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein or, if consented to in writing by the person to
be served, delivering a copy by electronic or other means.
(B) Service by mail is complete upon mailing. If the paper
served is notice of a hearing and if the hearing is scheduled 5
days or less from the date of service, service shall be by
delivery or other method of actual notice. Service by
electronic means is complete on transmission if transmission
is completed during normal business hours at the place
receiving the service; otherwise, service is complete on the
next business day.

Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.1 (j) (Supp. 2001)
(i) Any person whose license has been revoked by the Driver
License Division under this section may seek judicial review,
(ii) Judicial review of an informal adjudicative proceeding is a
2

trial. Venue is in the district court in the county in which the
offense occurred.

Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-224 (Supp. 2001)
(1) A person denied a license or whose license has been
cancelled, suspended or revoked by the division may seek
judicial review of the division's order.
(2)(a) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative
proceedings is in the district court in the county where the
offense occurred, which resulted in the cancellation,
suspension or revocation.
(b) Persons not residing in the state shall file in Salt Lake
County or the county where the offense occurred which
resulted in the cancellation, suspension or revocation.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(3) (Supp. 2001)
(3) This chapter does not affect any legal remedies otherwise
available to:
(a) compel an agency to take action; or
(b) challenge an agency's rule.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-5(l)(k) (1997)
(k) A copy of the presiding officer's order shall be promptly
mailed to each of the parties.

Utah Code Ann..§ 63-46b-14(3)(a) (1997)
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final
agency action within 30 days after the date that the order
constituting the final agency action is issued or is considered
to have been issued under Subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b).
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Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-18 (1997)
(1) Unless precluded by another statute, the agency may
grant a stay of its order or other temporary remedy during the
pendency of judicial review, according to the agency's rules.
(2) Parties shall petition the agency for a stay or other
temporary remedies unless extraordinary circumstances
require immediate judicial intervention.
(3) If the agency denies a stay or denies other temporary
remedies requested by a party, the agency's order of denial
shall be mailed to all parties and shall specify the reasons why
the stay or other temporary remedy was not granted.
(4) If the agency has denied a stay or other temporary remedy
to protect the public health, safety, or welfare against a
substantial threat, the court may not grant a stay or other
temporary remedy unless it finds that:
(a) the agency violated its own rules in denying the stay; or
(b) (i) the party seeking judicial review is likely to prevail
on the merits when the court finally disposes of the matter;
(ii) the party seeking judicial review will suffer
irreparable injury without immediate relief;
(iii) granting relief to the party seeking review will not
substantially harm other parties to the proceedings; and
(iv) the threat to the public health, safety, or welfare
relied upon by the agency is not sufficiently serious to justify
the agency's action under the circumstances.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (Supp 2001)
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters
civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and
not prohibited by law.
(2) The district court judges may issue all extraordinary writs
and other writs necessary to carry into effect their orders,
judgments, and decrees.
(3) The district court has jurisdiction over matters of lawyer
discipline consistent with the rules of the Supreme Court.
(4) The district court has jurisdiction over all matters
properly filed in the circuit court prior to July 1, 1996.
4

(5) The district court has appellate jurisdiction to adjudicate
trials de novo of the judgments of the justice court and of the
small claims department of the district court.
(6) Appeals from the final orders, judgments, and decrees of
the district court are under Sections 78-2-2 and 78-2a-3.
(7) The district court has jurisdiction to review:
(a) agency adjudicative proceedings as set forth in Title 63,
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, and shall
comply with the requirements of that chapter, in its review of
agency adjudicative proceedings; and
(b) municipal administrative proceedings in accordance
with Section 10-3-703.7.
(8) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the district court has
subject matter jurisdiction in class B misdemeanors, class C
misdemeanors, infractions, and violations of ordinances only
if:
(a) there is no justice court with territorial jurisdiction;
(b) the matter was properly filed in the circuit court prior
to July 1,1996;
(c) the offense occurred within the boundaries of the
municipality in which the district courthouse is located and
that municipality has not formed a justice court; or
(d) they are included in an indictment or information
covering a single criminal episode alleging the commission of
a felony or a class A misdemeanor.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Gilley was arrested on February 1, 2001, for violation of section 41-6-44, Utah
Code Ann.. Addendum B (Exhibit 1). The Division issued an order on February 25,
2001, pursuant to section 41-6-44.10, that revoked Gilley's driving privilege for a period
of eighteen months. Addendum B (Exhibit 1). On February 26, 2001, the Division mailed
that order to Gilley at 5655 North Inverness Court, Stansbury Park, Ut 84074, her place of
residence. Addendum B (Exhibit 1) and Addendum C at 8 & 9. Gilley appealed the
5

Division's revocation order to the District Court on May 21, 2001, by filing a "Complaint
and Petition for Order Temporarily Restraining Defendant from Suspending Petitioner's
Driving Privilege, and Ordering Reinstatement of Said Privilege Pending Trial, or for an
Order Staying the Order of Suspension under U.C.A. 63-46b-18; for Preliminary and
Permanent Injunction and Order Reversing the Suspension Order." Addendum A.
In response to Gilley's Complaint, the Division filed a motion to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction on the grounds that Gilley had failed to file her complaint for judicial
review within 30 days of the issuance of the Division's order as required by section 6346b-14 (3)(a), Utah Code Ann.. (R 7). The Division attached to its memorandum in
support of the motion to dismiss a copy of the order of revocation the Division sent to
Gilley's place of residence which shows a certificate of mailing stamp dated February 26,
2001 and signed by an employee of the Division. Addendum B (Exhibit 1). Gilley
opposed that motion arguing that since she was not served with notice of the Division's
intent to suspend or revoke her license, the Division lacked jurisdiction to revoke her
license in the first place. (R 27).
There was a temporary restraining order hearing on June 25, 2001, before the
Honorable David S. Young. At that hearing, Counsel for the Division agreed to a stay of
the revocation order pending the outcome of the appeal and a hearing on the motion to
dismiss was set for July 9, 2001. (R 11, 13)
At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Gilley wanted to present evidence that
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the Division did not personally serve her with notice of their intent to suspend or revoke
her license and that she never received a copy of the Division's order of revocation. The
Division agreed for the purpose of the hearing only that if Gilley took the stand she would
testify that she was not personally served with notice of the Division's intent to suspend
or revoke, and that she never received the February 26, 2001, order of revocation.
Addendum C at 12.
The District Court found that the order of revocation was mailed February 26,
2002, and that by depositing the order in the mail it was presumptively received.
Addendum C at 10. The District Court dismissed Gilley's complaint for lack of
jurisdiction because the Complaint was untimely filed. Addendum C at 14.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
There are no facts relevant to this appeal other than those set forth in the state of
the case because this case was dismissed absent a trial or evidentiary hearing.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The District Court did not err in dismissing Gilley's complaint for lack of
jurisidiction regardless of whether the initial notice of the Division's intent to suspend or
revoke was personally served on Gilley by the arresting officer. The District court did not
underestimate its broad, general jurisdiction. Gilley's complaint can only be determined
to be a traditional petition for review. Gilley filed her petition for review of agency
action outside the time restraints of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. Therefore,

7

the district court lack jurisdiction to hear the appeal regardless of the grounds for the
appeal.
ARGUMENT

I. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING
GILLEY'S COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION
A. The timeliness of filing a petition for review is jurisdictional.
The district court did not err in dismissing Gilley's complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. Historically, an individual can challenge jurisdiction (service), but that
challenge must be timely. See Thomas v. District Court of Third Judicial District 171
P.2d 667, 670 (Utah 1946) (noting that, as early as 1880, this court held that under the
statute defects of service must be timely raised by motion or it would be deemed waived.)
This court ha consistently refused to hear appeals that are not timely filed. See Sandy
City v. Woolsev. 2001 WL 312395 (Utah App.) ("When a timely notice of appeal is not
filed, this court lacks jurisdiction to consider an appeal.")
The time limits within which a person can challenge a final agency action are very
clear and controlled by statute. Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-224 (Supp. 2001) provides that a
person whose license has been suspended may seek "judicial review" of the Driver
License Division's order. The seeking of judicial review in drivers license cases is
controlled by the provisions of the Utah Administrative Procedure Act (hereinafter
UAPA), Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-l to 22. Brinkerhoff v. Schwendiman. 790 P.2d 587
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(UtahApp. 1990). UAPA provides:
a party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency
action within thirty days after the date that the order
constituting the final agency action is issued or is considered
to have issued under subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b).
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a) (1997).
Both the Utah Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have ruled that the date the
agency's final order bears on its face is considered the date of issue. Dusty's Inc. v. Utah
State Tax Commission, 842 P.2d 868, 870 (Utah 1992) (per curiam); Bonded Bicycle
Couriers v. Department of Employment Security, 844 P.2d 358, 360, (Utah App. 1992)
cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-5(l)(k) (1997),
requires that "copy of the presiding officer's order be promptly mailed to each of the
persons."
If a petition for review is not filed within the required thirty days of the date of
issue of the final agency action, as provided by section 63-46b-14(3)(a), it is untimely and
the district court lacks jurisdiction. Bonded Bicycle Couriers. 844 P.2d at 359-60; See
Silva v. Department of Emp. Sec. 786 P.2d 246, 247 (Utah App. 1990). (Holding, the
timeliness of filing a petition for review is jurisdictional.)
Here, the Division's final order which revoked Gilley's driving privilege is dated
February 25, 2001, and mailed February 26, 2001, as evidenced by the certificate of
service. Addendum B (Exhibit 1). Gilley did not file her appeal of that order until on or
about May 21, 2001, more than 80 days after the date of issue of the Division's final
9

order. Addendum A . As such, Gilley's appeal is clearly untimely.
Additionally, Gilley argued at the hearing on the motion to dismiss that she never
received the Division's final order,1 even though she agreed that it was mailed to her
place of residence. This argument also lacks merit. Under Rule 5(1), Utah Rules Civil.
Procedure service by mail is completed upon mailing. For administrative orders, a
mailing certificate which shows the date the order was sent is sufficient to establish the
required service. See Wiggins v. Board of Review, 824 P.2d 1199 (Utah App 1992).2
Section 63-46b-5(k) requires that the Division promptly mails the presiding officer's final

'In Gilley's complaint for review she did not allege that she never received a copy
of the final revocation order. She alleged merely that "Plaintiff was the subject of an
order suspending her driving privilege issued by the Defendant on or about March 5,
2001, and while Plaintiff is aware of, or suspects such Order was made, Defendant [sic]
does not have a copy of said Order." Addendum A at 2.
2

This court in Wiggins in defining what is meant by the word "issued" in section
63-46b-14(3)(a), held that "issue as used in section 63-46b-14(3)(a) means the date the
agency action is properly mailed, as accurately evidenced by the certificate of mailing..."
Wiggins 824 P.2d at 1199. In Wiggins this court concluded that the time for filing a
petition for review commenced the date the agency decision was mailed, and not when
the petitioner received the agency's decision. The Utah Supreme Court, in Dusty's Inc. v.
Utah State Tax Comm'n. 842 P.2d 868, 870 (Utah 1992) (per curiam), concluded without
specifically overruling Wiggins that the term "issued" as used in section 63-46b-14(3)(a),
means that date the order bears on its face. Based on the Supreme Court decision in
Dusty's Inc. this court then expressly overruled its decision in Wiggins and held "the date
the order constituting the final agency action issues is the date the order bears on its face,
and not the date it is mailed." Bonded Bicycle Couriers. 844 P.2d at 360, (citing Dusty's
Inc., 342 P.2d at 870.) Even though Wiggins was overruled, with respect to what is
meant by the word "issued," neither this Court nor the Supreme Court addressed what is
necessary to establish the required service nor did they determine that the 30-day time
period to file an appeal began upon Petitioner's receipt of the agency's final order.
10

order to each of the parties. Here, the certificate of mailing shows that the Division's
order was promptly mailed to Gilley on February 26, 2001, one day after the date of
issue, to Gilley's place of residence.
B. An allegation of lack of initial notice of intent to suspend or revoke
does not stop the running of the time to appeal a final order of
revocation.
Gilley argues in her opening brief that the District Court erred as a matter of law in
dismissing Gilley's complaint on the ground that it was not timely filed because the
Division never obtained proper jurisdiction and the time to file an appeal thus never
began to run. In support of her argument, Gilley relies on this Court's recent decision in
Mabus v. Blackstock, 994 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1999). However, Gilley's reliance on Mabus
is misplaced.
This Court in Mabus neither recognized, as argued by Gilley, nor ruled that the
time limits for fighting the revocation process do not run in cases in which the
Department never obtained jurisdiction in the first place. This Court did rule that "the
police officer's service of the immediate notice of intention to revoke with a form giving
basic information on how to obtain a hearing (service of immediate notice and basic
information) is the initiatory event" of the Driver License Division's administrative
process, and is therefore jurisdictional. Jd. at 1274. As such, the Division has the burden
of producing at the trial de novo competent evidence that the revocation proceeding was
initiated by service of immediate notice and basic information. Id. at 1275. In Mabus.
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the Division failed to present evidence of service of the notice of the intent to revoke at
the trial de novo. As a result this Court set aside the Division's action. This is not the
case in the instant action. Pursuant to the ruling in Mabus, Gilley had the right to
challenge the police officer's service of the immediate notice of the Division's intent to
revoke and basic information. Id, If Gilley's challenge was timely, the Division would
have needed to prove at the trial de novo that she was personally served with immediate
notice and basic information. IdL However, Gilley's challenge was not timely made. As a
result, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to hear Gilley's appeal. See Bonded Bicycle
Couriers, 844 P.2d at 359-60; Silva. 786 P.2d at 247.
Gilley is trying to circumvent the statutory time requirements for filing an appeal
to the district court by alleging lack of initial notice and by claiming she never received
the Division's final order of revocation. She should not be allowed to do this. The law is
clear a person can challenge jurisdiction, but the challenge must be timely. Gilley's
challenge was not timely. The District Court did not have jurisdiction to hear her appeal
regardless of the grounds for the appeal.
II. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT
TREATED GILLEY'S COMPLAINT AS A PETITION
FOR REVIEW
In her opening brief, Gilley argues for the first time on appeal, that the district
court underestimated its broad, general jurisdiction in that it failed to recognize that
Gilley's action was not a traditional appeal from the revocation process. Gilley goes on
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to argue that the district court should have recognize that, under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-34(1) &(2) and 63-46b-l(3)(a)(Supp. 2001), the district court had jurisdiction to issue a
writ to compel the agency to take action, and under section 78-3-4(7)(a), the district court
still had the authority to issue the order by virtue of its general appellate jurisdiction over
agency's adjudicative proceedings. These arguments are without merit and have been
waived because Gilley raised these arguments for the first time on appeal.
In any event, the district court did not underestimate its broad and general
jurisdiction as provided by section 78-3-4, and it correctly dismissed Gilley's appeal for
lack of jurisdiction because it was untimely filed. First, as argued by Gilley, section 78-34 (7)(a) does provide the district court with jurisdiction to review "agency adjudicative
proceedings as set forth in Title 63, chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act."
However, section 78-3-4(7)(a) also requires that the district court comply with the
requirements of UAPA in its review of adjudicative proceedings. Section 63-46b14(3)(a) of the UAPA requires a party to file a petition for judicial review of final agency
action within 30 days after the final order is issued. Here, Gilley failed to file her petition
for review within the time period required by section 63-46b-14(3)(a). As a result, the
district court did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal under section 78-3-4(7)(a) and it
had no choice, but to dismiss Gilley's appeal as untimely.
Second, the subsections 78-3-4(1) and(2) did not apply in this case to confer
jurisdiction on the district court. Gilley has failed to show that her complaint is anything
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but a traditional petition for review of agency action pursuant to UAPA. In paragraph 2 of
her complaint she alleges "venue pursuant to sections 53-3-224 and 41-6-44.1
(h)(i)(ii)3(1953 as amended)." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.1 (j) (Supp. 2001) states:
(i) Any person whose license has been revoked by the Driver
License Division under this section may seek judicial review,
(ii) Judicial review of an informal adjudicative proceeding is a
trial. Venue is in the district court in the county in which the
offense occurred.
Section 53-3-224 states:
(1) A person denied a license or whose license has been
cancelled, suspended or revoked by the division may seek
judicial review of the division's order.
(2)(a) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative
proceedings is in the district court in the county where the
offense occurred, which resulted in the cancellation,
suspension or revocation.
(b) Persons not residing in the state shall file in Sail Lake
County or the county where the offense occurred which
resulted in the cancellation, suspension or revocation.
In addition, in her complaint, Gilley specifically states that her request for a temporary
stay is pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-18 (1997), Gilley does not allege
jurisdiction pursuant to any other statute or code.
Gilley neither alleged in her complaint nor argued in her opposition to the
Division's motion to dismiss or at the hearing on the motion to dismiss that she was
petitioning the district court for an extraordinary writ. Furthermore, Gilley does not seek

3

Gilley was incorrect in citing to Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (h) which does address
venue. Section 41 -6-44.10 (j)(i)(ii) addresses venue and judicial review.
14

an order compelling the Division to take action. She seeks an order from the district court
reversing an action taken by Division. As such, there is no way Gilley's complaint can be
interpreted as being anything other than a petition for review of the Division's order
pursuant to sections 53-3-224 and 41-6-44.1(j). The district court does not have
jurisdiction to hear her petition for review because it was filed outside the time restraints
mandated by section 63-46b-14(3)(a)
CONCLUSION
Fore the foregoing reasons, the Division respectfully requests that this court
uphold the lower court's ruling that it did not have jurisdiction to hear Gilley's appeal
because her petition for review for agency action was untimely filed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^

day of April, 2002.

&EBECCA D. WALDRON
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Driver License Division
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Rebecca D. Waldron, counsel for the Division, hereby certify that on the
day of April, 2002,1 caused to be hand delivered an original and seven copies of the
foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State, Fifth Floor, PO Box 140230,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 and two copies to J. Franklin J. Allred, Attorney for
Appellate, 321 South 600 East, Salt Lake City, Ut 84102
DATED this 25

day of April, 2002.

Rebecca D. Waldron
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDUM A
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J. FRANKLIN ALLRED A0058
J. FRANKLIN ALLRED P.C.

en:.'"?! F;; 3:1*3

Attorney for Plaintiff
321 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801)531-1114
Facsimile: (801)531-1113
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, TOOELE COUNTY
TOOELE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
MELINDA GILLEY,

;)
)
)
>
Plaintiff,
;)
vs.
])
)
G. BARTON BLACKSTOCK, AND THE ;)
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY,
;)
OFFICE OF DRIVER LICENSE
;)
SERVICE,
;)
)
Defendants.
])

COMPLAINT AND PETITION FOR
ORDER TEMPORARILY
RESTRAINING DEFENDANT FROM
SUSPENDING PETITIONER'S
DRIVING PRIVILEGE, AND
ORDERING REINSTATEMENT OF SAID
PRIVILEGE PENDING TRIAL,
OR FOR AN ORDER STAYING THE
ORDER OF SUSPENSION UNDER
U.C.A. 63-46b-18;FOR
PRELIMINARY AND PERMANENT
INJUNCTION AND ORDER
REVERSING THE SUSPENSION ORDER

)

Judge: David S. Young

)

Case No:

0103>OQ534AA

The Plaintiff-Petitioner above-named, complains of the Defendant and for cause of action
alleges:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
1.

Plaintiff is a resident of Tooele County, State of Utah and venue is in the above-

entitled Court pursuant to U.C.A. 53-3-224 and U.C.A. 41-6-44.1(h)(i)(ii)(1953, as amended).
2.

Plaintiff was the subject of an order suspending her driving privilege issued by the
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Defendant on or about March 5th, 2001, and while Plaintiff is aware of, or suspects such Order
was made, Defendant does not have a copy of said Order.
3.

The Defendant had no authority to proceed against the Petitioner's driving

privilege for the following reasons:
a.. The Defendant's lack jurisdiction over Plaintiff because the document through
which jurisdiction was attempted to be exercised was not personally served on Plaintiff as
required by
b. The Defendant had no jurisdiction to take action against the Defendant,
because any notice claimed to have been served failed to give Defendant notice of the nature of
the type of penalty the Defendants proposed to impose.
c. Defendants lack jurisdiction over Plaintiff because they purport to take action
against Plaintiff under to mutually exclusive statutory procedures.
d. The Plaintiff did not refuse to take a test to determine her blood alcohol level
because the officer requesting the test failed to advise Plaintiff that he did not have the right to
have her attorney present nor the right to counsel before he determined what action to take with
respect to the officer's request she take a test.
e. Plaintiff was confused about her obligation to take multiple tests, given the
multiplicity of requests to take breath tests, and after having taken several, was never told she
must continue to take tests until the requesting person decided to stop requiring them.
f. Plaintiff took a breath test and the arresting officer obtained a sample of
Plaintiffs breath, and the officer had a duty to, but failed, to explain the difference between the
test Plaintiff took and the impact of §41-6-44 (l)(b), which under the circumstances he was
2
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obligated to do.

4.

The Defendants acted contrary to law in revoking

Petitioner's driving privileges for the reason that Defendant's arrest was a violation of Plaintiff s
rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and
Article I Section Fourteen of the Utah Constitution.
5

The Defendants acted contrary to law in revoking Plaintiff-Petitioner's driving

privilege for the reason that at the time of his arrest her arrest she was not driving a vehicle was
not incapable of safely driving a vehicle nor did he have a blood alcohol content in excess of
.08%.
6.

Less than thirty days have passed since notification of the acts of the Defendant

complained of herein.
7.

Plaintiff has had no actual notice of the acts of the Defendants complained of
herein.

8.

That Plaintiff-Petitioner is entirely dependent on a driving privilege for a

livelihood and will suffer immediate and irreparable harm in being unable to conduct every-day
commerce, to move about the community in the pursuit of business, for purposes of health care,
and obtaining the necessities of life which consequences are also extraordinary circumstances
requiring immediate judicial intervention both of which justify an order either restraining and
enjoining or staying the Defendant from continuing the status of Plaintiff as suspended or
revoked.
9.

There is a substantial likelihood that Plaintiff will prevail in this action.

10.

Granting relief to Plaintiff/Petitioner will not harm other parties to the suit nor is

there any threat to public health, safety or welfare sufficiently serious to justify the agency's
3

action under the circumstances.
11. Unless a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction are ordered, or
unless a stay is granted, Plaintiff risks the cause of action becoming moot under the ruling in
Phillips v. Schwendiman 802 P.2d 108 (Utah App. 1990).
12.

The Plaintiff-Petitioner is entitled to a judicial review of the findings of the

Department which judicial review contemplates an evidentiary hearing, at which hearing
Defendants have the burden of sustaining their jurisdiction and their action against the Petitioner
by a standard of beyond a reasonable doubt, except as to jurisdiction which must be proved by a
preponderance of the evidence.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff-Petitioner prays for the following relief:
1.

The Court grant a hearing for temporary relief and at said hearing enter a

Preliminary Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction temporarily restraining and
enjoining the Defendant from suspending Plaintiff-Petitioner's driving privilege until a full trial
in the matter, or, enter an order staying the order of suspension, or, in the alterative, for an
immediate trial on this Petition.
2.

For a judgment in Plaintiff-Petitioner's favor finding the Defendants have no

jurisdiction nor, in the alternative, any legal basis on which to adversely affect PlaintiffPetitioner's driving privileges.
3.

For an Order permanently reinstating Plaintiff-Petitioner's driving privilege and

requiring the Defendant to remove any indication of adverse action from Plaintiffs permanent
driving history.

.

DATED this ? % day of May, 2001
4

L ^ A N K L I N ALLRED
/Attorney for the Plaintiff

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I here by certify that on the 4^

tlayofMay. 2001, a true and correct copy of the

forgoing COMPLAINT AND PETITION was hand deposited in the U. S. Mail, postage prepaid
and addressed to:
REBECCA WALDRON
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
160 EAST 200 SOUTH, 6 TH FLOOR
P.O. BOX 140856
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114

DATED this

day of January, 2001.

5

00001

ADDENDUM A

J. FRANKLIN ALLRED A0058
J. FRANKLIN ALLRED P.C.
Attorney for Plaintiff
321 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801)531-1114
Facsimile: (801)531-1113

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, TOOELE COUNTY
TOOELE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
MELINDA GILLEY,

;)
I
1
I
Plaintiff,
)I
vs.
))
>
G. BARTON BLACKSTOCK, AND THE ;)
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY,
;)
OFFICE OF DRIVER LICENSE
])
SERVICE,
;>
>
Defendants.
]>

COMPLAINT AND PETITION FOR
ORDER TEMPORARILY
RESTRAINING DEFENDANT FROM
SUSPENDING PETITIONER'S
DRIVING PRIVILEGE, AND
ORDERING REINSTATEMENT OF SAID
PRIVILEGE PENDING TRIAL,
OR FOR AN ORDER STAYING THE
ORDER OF SUSPENSION UNDER
U.C.A. 63-46b-18; FOR
PRELIMINARY AND PERMANENT
INJUNCTION AND ORDER
REVERSING THE SUSPENSION ORDER

i

Judge: David S. Young

I

Case No:

The Plaintiff-Petitioner above-named, complains of the Defendant and for cause of action
alleges:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
1.

Plaintiff is a resident of Tooele County, State of Utah and venue is in the above-

entitled Court pursuant to U.C.A. 53-3-224 and U.C.A. 41-6-44.1(h)(i)(ii)(1953, as amended).
2.

Plaintiff was the subject of an order suspending her driving privilege issued by the

Defendant on or about March 5th, 2001, and while Plaintiff is aware of, or suspects such Order
was made, Defendant does not have a copy of said Order.
3.

The Defendant had no authority to proceed against the Petitioner's driving

privilege for the following reasons:
a.. The Defendant's lack jurisdiction over Plaintiff because the document through
which jurisdiction was attempted to be exercised was not personally served on Plaintiff as
required by
b. The Defendant had no jurisdiction to take action against the Defendant,
because any notice claimed to have been served failed to give Defendant notice of the nature of
the type of penalty the Defendants proposed to impose.
c.

Defendants lack jurisdiction over Plaintiff because they purport to take action

against Plaintiff under to mutually exclusive statutory procedures.
d. The Plaintiff did not refuse to take a test to determine her blood alcohol level
because the officer requesting the test failed to advise Plaintiff that he did not have the right to
have her attorney present nor the right to counsel before he determined what action to take with
respect to the officer's request she take a test.
e. Plaintiff was confused about her obligation to take multiple tests, given the
multiplicity of requests to take breath tests, and after having taken several, was never told she
must continue to take tests until the requesting person decided to stop requiring them.
f. Plaintiff took a breath test and the arresting officer obtained a sample of
Plaintiffs breath, and the officer had a duty to, but failed, to explain the difference between the
test Plaintiff took and the impact of §41-6-44 (l)(b), which under the circumstances he was

2
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obligated to do.

4.

The Defendants acted contrary to law in revoking

Petitioner's driving privileges for the reason that Defendant's arrest was a violation of Plaintiff s
rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and
Article I Section Fourteen of the Utah Constitution.
5

The Defendants acted contrary to law in revoking Plaintiff-Petitioner's driving

privilege for the reason that at the time of his arrest her arrest she was not driving a vehicle was
not incapable of safely driving a vehicle nor did he have a blood alcohol content in excess of
.08%.
6.

Less than thirty days have passed since notification of the acts of the Defendant

complained of herein.
7.

Plaintiff has had no actual notice of the acts of the Defendants complained of
herein.

8.

That Plaintiff-Petitioner is entirely dependent on a driving privilege for a

livelihood and will suffer immediate and irreparable harm in being unable to conduct every-day
commerce, to move about the community in the pursuit of business, for purposes of health care,
and obtaining the necessities of life which consequences are also extraordinary circumstances
requiring immediate judicial intervention both of which justify an order either restraining and
enjoining or staying the Defendant from continuing the status of Plaintiff as suspended or
revoked.
9.

There is a substantial likelihood that Plaintiff will prevail in this action.

10.

Granting relief to Plaintiff/Petitioner will not harm other parties to the suit nor is

there any threat to public health, safety or welfare sufficiently serious to justify the agency's

3

action under the circumstances.
11. Unless a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction are ordered, or
unless a stay is granted, Plaintiff risks the cause of action becoming moot under the ruling in
Phillips v. Schwendiman 802 P.2d 108 (Utah App. 1990).
12.

The Plaintiff-Petitioner is entitled to a judicial review of the findings of the

Department which judicial review contemplates an evidentiary hearing, at which hearing
Defendants have the burden of sustaining their jurisdiction and their action against the Petitioner
by a standard of beyond a reasonable doubt, except as to jurisdiction which must be proved by a
preponderance of the evidence.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff-Petitioner prays for the following relief:
1.

The Court grant a hearing for temporary relief and at said hearing enter a

Preliminary Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction temporarily restraining and
enjoining the Defendant from suspending Plaintiff-Petitioner's driving privilege until a full trial
in the matter, or, enter an order staying the order of suspension, or, in the alterative, for an
immediate trial on this Petition.
2.

For a judgment in Plaintiff-Petitioner's favor finding the Defendants have no

jurisdiction nor, in the alternative, any legal basis on which to adversely affect PlaintiffPetitioner's driving privileges.
3.

For an Order permanently reinstating Plaintiff-Petitioner's driving privilege and

requiring the Defendant to remove any indication of adverse action from Plaintiffs permanent
driving history.

.

ft
DATED this * % day of May, 2001
4

L^6ANKLINXLLRED /
/Attorney for the Plaintiff

MAILING
,ING CERTIFICATE
I here by certify that on the 9^

tfavofMay, 2001, a true and correct copy of the

forgoing COMPLAINT AND PETITION was hand deposited in the U. S. Mail, postage prepaid
and addressed to:
REBECCA WALDRON
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
160 EAST 200 SOUTH, 6TH FLOOR
P.O. BOX 140856
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114

DATED this

g£

day of January, 2001
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ADDENDUM B

REBECCA D. WALDRON (6148)
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
P.O. Box 140857
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857
Telephone: (801)366-0353
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MELINDA GILLEY,
Petitioner,

:
:

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR
FAILURE TO TIMELY FILE

vs.
G. BARTON BLACKSTOCK, AND THE :
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY,
OFFICE OF DRIVERS LICENSE
:
SERVICE,

Case # 010300534 AA
Judge David S. Young

Respondent.

Respondent, by and through its counsel of record, submits this Memorandum in support
of its Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Timely File.
MEMORANDUM
Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-220 provides that a person whose license has been suspended
may seek "judicial review" of the Driver License Division's order. The seeking of judicial

review in drivers license cases is controlled by the provisions of the Utah Administrative
Procedure Act (UAPA), Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-l to 22. Brinkerhoffv. Schwendiman, 790
P.2d 587 (Utah App. 1990). UAPA provides:
a party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action
within thirty days after the date that the order constituting the final
agency action is issued or is considered to have issued under
subsection 63-46M3 (3)(b).
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a).
As noted and alleged in Petitioner's Appeal, the Petitioner's drivers license was revoked
by an administrative order dated February 25, 2001. (Exhibit 1, Driver License Division Order).
Petitioner should have filed her Appeal on or before March 27, 2001. She did not do so until
May 18, 2001, and therefore this Court lacks jurisdiction to review this matter.
In Bonded Bicycle Couriers v. Department of Employment Security, 844 P.2d 358 (Utah
App. 1992), the Utah Court of Appeals dealt with the issue of timeliness of an appeal seeking
judicial review of an administrative order. The Court held that the date of the order is the date
the order was issued and the date it had on its face. The Court held in that case that the "timely
filing of a petition for review from final agency action is jurisdictional," 844 P.2d at 358. The
Utah Supreme Court reached a similar opinion in Dusty's. Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 842
P.2d 868 (Utah 1992). The Supreme Court held, in the Dustv's, Inc. case, that "for the guidance
of all those who petition for judicial review from agency action, we hold that the date the order

2

constituting final agency action issues is the date the order bears on its face," and not the date it
is mailed. Dustv's. Inc., 842 P.2d 868, 870 (Utah 1992).
Petitioner failed to file this Appeal within thirty (30) days of the issuance of the Driver
License Division order. The Driver License Division order was issued on February 2, 2001.
Petitioner's Appeal was not filed with the Court until May 18, 2001. Thus, the Court lacks
jurisdiction to conduct a judicial review of the Driver License Division order in this case.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, Respondent respectfully requests that the Court issue an
order dismissing this Appeal with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.
Dated this

/J_ day of June, 2001.

7//

7/k/Y/uJ ttm^
.Rebecca D. Waldron
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondent
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EXHIBIT 1

i c M i n ^ l t U h MAILING
tint on the date below as an emplovee of the Dmers License Division
'
tatc Department ot Public Safet\ I deposited the Lnited States Mail Salt
Lave Cit\ I tah the original order ot which this is an exact cop> in an envelope
w ith postage stamp and address to the person named in the order, at his or her last
address as shown by the records^rfihe D*j:
Date

State of Utah
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION
Michael O Leavitt
Governor
Robert L Flowers
Commissioner
Earl R. Morris
Deputy Commissioner

P O BOX 30560
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130-0560
(801)965-4437

Emplovee ot Department
merit

C /^

DATE OF ARREST: 0 1 FEB 2 0 0 1
DATE OF BIRTH: 02 JAN 1972
LICENSE/FILE NUMBER: 149555043
DATE: 25 FEB 2001
THIS ORDER IS EFFECTIVE
12:01 AM ON 03 MAR 2001

MELINDA MCKEAN GILLEY
5655 NORTH INVERNESS COURT
STANSBURY PARK UT 84074

AS A RESULT OF REFUSAL TO SUBMIT TO A CHEMICAL TEST, YOUR DRIVING PRIVILEGE IS
REVOKED FOR A PERIOD OF EIGHTEEN (18) MONTHS EFFECTIVE 03 MAR 2001. THE BASIS FOR
THIS ACTION IS THE HEARING OFFICER'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION THAT YOU
REFUSED TO SUBMIT TO A CHEMICAL TEST AFTER BEING REQUESTED AND WARNED BY A PEACE
OFFICER, OR YOU FAILED TO REQUEST A HEARING, OR YOU FAILED TO APPEAR FOR THE
HEARING, CONTRARY TO UCA 41-6-44.10 OR THE IMPLIED CONSENT LAW OF ANOTHER STATE.
THIS ACTION IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH TITLES 41 AND 53 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953.
THIS NOTICE DOES NOT REPLACE ANY PRIOR NOTICE ALREADY IN EFFECT.
***IMPORTANT INFORMATION - PLEASE READ***
WHEN YOUR DRIVING PRIVILEGE HAS BEEN REVOKED FOR A DRUG OR ALCOHOL VIOLATION YOU
MUST DISCONTINUE DRIVING ALL MOTOR VEHICLES. IT IS A MISDEMEANOR TO OPERATE ANY
MOTOR VEHICLE UPON THE HIGHWAYS OF THIS STATE UNTIL THE SANCTION PERIOD IS OVER,
YOU HAVE REINSTATED AND OBTAINED A VALID DRIVING PRIVILEGE.
YOU MAY APPEAL THIS ACTION IN THE DISTRICT COURT IN THE COUNTY IN WHICH THE
OFFENSE OCCURRED WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS OF THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS NOTICE.
TO REINSTATE YOU MUST COMPLY WITH THE FOLLOWING:
PAY A $50.00 REINSTATEMENT FEE. PAY AN ADMINISTRATIVE FEE OF $150.00. OTHER FEES
MAY APPLY.
MAKE CHECK OR MONEY ORDER PAYABLE TO: UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY.
PLEASE INDICATE YOUR LICENSE OR FILE NUMBER ON THE CHECK OR MONEY ORDER AND MAIL
TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.
APPLY FOR A NEW DRIVER LICENSE BY TAKING THE REQUIRED TESTS AND PAYING THE FEE.
UPON REINSTATEMENT YOU WILL HAVE A "NO-ALCOHOL" CONDITIONAL LICENSE.

RESPECTULLY,

G. BARTON BLACKSTOCK, BUREAU CHIEF
DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION
CC:
GBB: JREED
A12R
(REFUSAL)

—

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO TIMELY FILE, postage
prepaid, on this

'

day of June, 2001, to the following:

J. FRANKLIN ALLRED
Attorney for Plaintiff
321 SOUTH 600 EAST
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84102

•V/A-'
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ADDENDUM C

ORIGINAL TRANSCRIPT
->,,«„

FILED

3RD DISTRICT COURT TOOELE

01 NOV-5 F M 5 : | 2
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FILED BYj
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAI
MELINDA GILLEY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
G. BARTON BLACKSTOCK,
AND THE DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC SAFETY, OFFICE OF
DRIVER LICENSE SERVICES,

Case No. 010300534

Defendants.

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 9th day of July,
2001, the above-entitled matter came on for Hearing
before the HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG, sitting as Judge
in the above-named Court for the purpose of this cause,
and that the following audiotape proceedings were had.

NOV 2 1 2001
COURT OF APPEALS

-jotffflm

itiCourt, LLC

THE REPORTING GROUP
801.532.3441

TOLL FREE 8 7 7 . 5 3 2 . 3 4 4 1

50 South Main, Suite 920
Salt Lake Cit\, Utah 84144
FAX 801.532.3414

2
A P P E A R A N C E S
For the Plaintiff:

J. FRANKLIN ALLRED, ESQ.
J. FRANKLIN ALLRED P.C.
321 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

For the Defendant

REBECCA WALDRON, ESQ.
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
160 East 200 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140856
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

1

THE COURT:

2 \Melinda

Gilly

Now let's return to the matter of

vs.

G. Barton Blackstock,

010300534.

3 Your argument, briefly?
4

MR. ALLRED:

J. Franklin Allred on behalf of the

5

Plaintiff, Your Honor.

6

MS. WALDRON:

Rebecca Waldron on behalf of the

7 Respondent.
8

THE COURT:

All right.

You may proceed.

If you

9 wish to submit it on the papers, I'd be happy, or you
10 may proceed with argument, as you wish.
11

MR. ALLRED:

Your Honor, I understood we were

12 going to have some opportunity to advance some evidence
13 here, and that the first step would be they'd need to
14 prove that the document, which the Drivers License
15 Division intended to use, over which to obtain
16 jurisdiction of the Gilleys, is the very first matter
17 that needs to be established, and it's a factual
18 matter.
19

MS. WALDRON:

20

MR. ALLRED:

Your Honor-I think we were talking about doing

21 that when we were here last week.
22

MS. WALDRON:

Your Honor, the Respondent's

23 position is that whether or not notice was served at
24 the very beginning of—well, when the individual was
25 arrested, is not at issue here.

My argument is,

4
1

assuming that notice was not served, which I'm not

2

saying it is, but assuming, for this motion to dismiss,

3

it was not.

4

THE COURT: Right.

5

MS. WALDRON:

6

The appeal in this case was filed

late, and based on the cases I've cited in my moving

7 papers and my reply memorandum, it is an untimely
8

challenge—an untimely challenge.

9

really matter if notice was served or if notice was

10 not, it's untimely.

So, it doesn't

This Court does not have

11 jurisdiction to hear the appeal, because the appeal was
12 filed late.
13

THE COURT:

Okay.

Now, if I understand their

14 position, it is that they have to have some fundamental
15 notice.

They get a citation.

They then have notice of

16 remedies associated with hearings that they can
17 request, and so on, which may be in the citation, and
18 they then having a hearing.

The hearing is conducted.

19 Then there is a ruling out of the hearing and then they
20 have—that starts the time for them to appeal to the
21 District Court.

Now, if I'm understanding their

22 position, it is they didn't get the predicate
23 information; thus, that original date did not pass.
24 So they have taken the position that they haven't been
25 I given the timely beginning for that notice of appeal.

5
1

MS. WALDRON:

Well, what they're saying is that

2 the—they're claiming, because of this lack of notice,
3 that the Drivers License Division did not have a proper
4

jurisdiction.

However, on—when an individual does not

5

request a hearing, no matter what the reason i s —

6

THE COURT:

Okay.

7

MS. WALDRON:

--they are sent—the file's reviewed

8

and they are sent an order, either suspending their

9

license or not suspending their license —

10

THE COURT:

Okay.

11

MS. WALDRON:

—which I've attached to our moving

12 papers —
13

THE COURT: Right.

14

MS. WALDRON:

15

THE COURT:

16

MS. WALDRON:

17

THE COURT:

18

MS. WALDRON:

19

THE COURT:

20

MS. WALDRON:

— a copy of that order.

Right, and I have a copy.
And on the—in the —

And that's February 1, 2001, right?
Exactly.

Okay.
Now, on that order it says, "You may

21 appeal this action in the District Court in the county
22 in which the offense occurred within 30 days of the
23 effective date of this notice."
24

THE COURT:

Okay.

25

MS. WALDRON:

They have a right to appeal the

6
1 II Drivers License Administrative action 30 days from the
2

effective date of that order, which is March 3, 2001,

3 which, in appealing that, then they can challenge the
4 notice.

They did not file a notice of appeal within

5

30 days of that date.

It is my argument, based on the

6

cases that are cited, it is untimely.

7

individual could totally disregard the 30-day rule,

Otherwise, an

8 bring it a year and a half later, saying, oh, n o —
9

allege no notice was given—

10

THE COURT:

Uh-huh.

11

MS. WALDRON:

—which would throw out the notice

12 of appeals rules.

Also, the case I've cited in there

13 addresses when, like, proper service is challenged in a
14 regular civil case.

They say, yes, you can challenge

15 that service, but it has to be timely.
16

THE COURT:

17

MS. WALDRON:

Okay.

All right.

Also, if a case is filed in the

18 Court of Appeals challenging jurisdiction in the lower
19 Court, or service, that has to be timely.

You can't

20 file an untimely appeal and just say, hey, that doesn't
21 matter, because we're challenging the initial service.
22

THE COURT:

Okay.

So, your position is that

23 even—they got an initial citation, whatever transpired
24 thereafter, they thereafter received—and the initial
25 I citation says the date of—or this document says the

7
1

date of arrest was February 2001, and they thereafter

2

got the notice of t h e — w e l l —

3

MS. WALDRON:

4

THE COURT:

Agency action.
— t h e agency action, all right, and

5

that certainly gave them notice of a date for a

6

beginning to their appeals period.

7

MS. WALDRON:

8

THE COURT:

9

Exactly.
All right.

And they filed this May 1,

if I recall, or May something.

10

MS. WALDRON:

11

THE COURT:

12

MS. WALDRON:

13

THE COURT:

14

MS. WALDRON:

15

THE COURT:

16

MS. WALDRON:

They filed it, I think—
May 21.
Exactly, which was like 8 0 —
No, is t h a t —
They filed it on May 18.
May 21.

Okay.

The effective date of the agency

17

action was—well, the date was February 25, but I think

18

the effective date was March 3.

19

THE COURT:

Actually, it was filed May 21, it was

20

signed on May 18, and so the effective date—March 30

21

was the period or the time that they were given

22

notice—somewhere in that time period.

23
24
25

MS. WALDRON:

I can tell you—show—the effective

date of the agency action was March 3.
THE COURT:

Okay.

8
1
2
3

MS. WALDRON:

So, technically, they had 30 days

from March 3 within which to file the appeal.
THE COURT:

All right.

Thank you.

All right, Mr.

4 Allred, briefly.
5

MR. ALLRED:

Which gives rise to a second critical

6

fact, which must be proved.

7

that the notice was mailed regular mail, not certified

8

receipt return requested.

9
10

THE COURT:
MR. ALLRED:

I believe the claim is

Not served.

Uh-huh.
And so they are trying to assume that

11 that was received, that notice.

It still doesn't

12 change the underlying defect in jurisdiction.

So the

13 facts we're here to prove today is, one, there was
14 never any receipt of the statutory notice authorizing
15 the Defendant's (inaudible) Department to obtain
16 jurisdiction.
17

THE COURT:

Are you saying that they're obligated

18 to mail all of these by certified mail, return receipt
19 requested?
20

MR. ALLRED:

I am saying they have some obligation

21 to prove that it was received.
22

THE COURT:

All they have to do—this—driving is

23 a privilege, and all they'd have to do, in my judgment,
24 unless I'm wrong on this, is show that they mailed it
25 at least to the driver's license address.

Does your

9
1

client acknowledge the address 5655 North Inverness

2

Court?

3

MR. ALLRED:

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. ALLRED:

That's the correct address.
Okay.

All right.

But the client denies that it was

6 ever received.
7

THE COURT:

8

MR. ALLRED:

9

Okay.
And the whole factual claim must—or

the whole argument that counsel makes for the motion

10 must rest on some factual proceeding.
11 prima

facie

Maybe there's a

showing by attaching the document and then

12

coming in and saying it was received.

13

satisfactory to start the appeal time running if it was

14

not, in actuality, received.

15

sitting by here trying connive a way into this Court.

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. ALLRED:

Uh-huh.

But it is not

These people aren't

Well, I understand that.

If they'd had that notice, they

18

would've done so.

19

asking the Court to hear today, which I thought we were

20

going to do, was the initial—whether or not there was

21

jurisdiction.

22

THE COURT:

So the factual things that we're

Okay.

Well, I will let you make a

23

proffer briefly of the facts.

24

understand.

25

2001, and issued a citation.

But this is what I

Your client was arrested on February 1,
That citation gave rise

10
1

to the potential of denial of your client's license,

2

based on refusal to submit to a chemical test.

3

Department mailed, on or about February 26, with a

4

Department employee's signature, the information of the

5

letter—notice of intent to revoke, I guess.

6

doesn't have a title to it, but it is this letter,

7

which you've seen attached to their pleadings.

8
9

And the

It

So, your client knew at least they were initiating
proceedings in February because of the citation, where

10

she was present.

And the Court would have to find, by

11

depositing this in the mail, it would presumptively

12 I have been received.

Now, she can file an affidavit in

13

opposition to that, but she doesn't file her cause of

14

action until May 18, at the earliest, and May 21 is

15

actually the date it's filed in the courthouse.

16

that's a long time from February.

17

you can supplement the record.

18

further testimony.

19
20

MR. ALLRED:

So

So my concern is,

I don't think I need

I'm ready to rule on the motion.

Well, and if the Court relates that

back and says she was advised of the proceedings.

21

THE COURT:

22

of the proceedings.

23

MR. ALLRED:

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. ALLRED:

Well, the citation gave certain advice

But the citation was not served.
Wasn't it hand-delivered?
It was not served, period.

We deny

11
1

that it was served-

2

here to prove, initially, is that the citation was

3

served.

4

testify that that's (inaudible).

5
6

And I've got two witnesses here prepared to

THE COURT:

Okay.

Well, this isn't the time for

testimony.

7

MR. ALLRED:

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. ALLRED:

10

And that's the fact that we're

Yeah.

That's what I'm saying.

Yeah.
That's what I—I thought we were

going to do that.

11

THE COURT:

Uh-huh.

12

MR. ALLRED:

So, the initial thing the Court must

13

decide is whether or not there was service of the

14

document to obtain jurisdiction.

15

indicates that—and that's attached to our response--

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. ALLRED:

The Mavis

case

Right.
—indicates that if there is no

18

jurisdiction, the Court cannot take any action, but the

19

Court certainly can look to determine whether it has

20

jurisdiction.

21

document, which would give jurisdiction over this

22

Plaintiff, served?

23

is absolutely not--no way, shape or form.

So the initial question is, was a

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. ALLRED:

And that answer to that factually

Okay.
So, if we can have a hearing on that

12
1 point, then maybe the Court might still find that there
2 was an obligation, and that it might have been somehow
3

imposed by a letter claimed to have been sent, but I've

4

got two witnesses who will—

5

THE COURT:

I'll tell you what I'll do.

I'll just

6

simply invite you and Ms. Waldron to see if you can

7

agree on a statement of facts, based on what their

8

testimony would be.

I'm prepared to rule on the

9 motion, based on the letter and the—just simply the
10 dates, the filing times.
11

MS. WALDRON:

Ms. Waldron?

Your Honor, I would be willing, for

12 the purpose of this motion only, to say, assume notice
13 was not given-14

THE COURT:

Well, right.

15

MS. WALDRON:

—which I'm not agreeing to, but

16 assume, for the purpose of this motion only, that no
17 notice was given.
18

THE COURT:

Okay.

19

MS. WALDRON:

The initial summons and citation was

20 not personally served.

It is my position here today,

21 because the appeal is untimely filed, he has waived his
22 right to challenge that.
23

THE COURT:

Okay.

I understand that.

So, what

24 they're assuming then is that your facts are given.
25

MR. ALLRED:

Yeah.

There was no service—

13
1

THE COURT:

2

MR. ALLRED:

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. ALLRED:

5

THE COURT:

6
7

Right.
— o f the initiatory document—
Okay.
—under Mavis.
All right.

The second—

That may be a part of the

record.
MR. ALLRED:

The second fact, I guess, which they

8

would have to admit is that the letter, claimed to have

9

been mailed--

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. ALLRED:

12

THE COURT:

Uh-huh.
--was not mailed and not received.
Now, I'm not so sure that they did

13 not-14

MR. ALLRED:

(Inaudible) not mailed.

They might—

15

they might believe they mailed it.

16

something in the document that says it was mailed.

17

THE COURT:

18

in respect to that.

19

the record of this case.

20

MR. ALLRED:

There might be

Well, the file will speak for itself
That document has been placed in
So—

If they'll stipulate that the

21

record--that it was not received, or that our testimony

22

is that that document was not received.

23

have some actual notice (inaudible).

24
25

THE COURT:

Okay.

They've got to

Well, do you have any objection

to agreeing that their testimony would be that it was

14
1
2

not received?
MS. WALDRON:

I will agree that—to his proffer

3

that if the--they--the Petitioner would take the stand,

4

she would say, "I did not receive the letter of agency

5

action/'

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. ALLRED:

Okay.
They should go a little further than

8

that, because the Petitioner was in a daily--in a

9

facility, at Day Spring, and her husband was actually

10

running the household through the majority of that time

11

and monitoring the mail, and he's here as well, David

12

Gilley, to testify that there was no letter from the

13

Driver License Division that came.

14

facts, Your Honor, that we would hope to establish.

15

THE COURT:

Okay.

Those are the

Well, you've made that

16

statement.

I'm not sure the State can agree to it, but

17

they certainly agree to the facts consistent with no

18

service.

19

motion to dismiss this appeal as untimely should be and

20

the same is granted.

21

prepare an order consistent with t h a t —

So, the Court finds that the Defendant's

22

MS. WALDRON:

23

THE COURT:

24
25

Ms. Waldron, I'll ask you to

Thank you, Your Honor.
— s o we'll have something in the

record.
MS. WALDRON:

Thank you, Your Honor.

15
1 II

THE COURT:

2I

MR. ALLRED:

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Thank you, Mr. Allred,
Thank you
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